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1. A five-year warning from the global securities watchdog
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) warned on Thursday, November 19, 2026, that quantum computers capable of breaking the cryptography used across finance could appear within five years. For quantum computing, Bitcoin (BTC) and the banking system now share one problem, the 63-page report argues: replacing vulnerable protections will take years, and most institutions have hardly begun.
IOSCO, the body through which securities regulators around the world coordinate their standards, based its timeline on the views of industry experts. It described several existing quantum systems as 'highly advanced', while stressing that no machine known today can defeat the encryption methods in common use.
The concern, in other words, is not an attack already under way. It is the distance between how long a defence takes to build and how soon that defence may be needed. If the overhaul of banks, payment networks and crypto systems runs for years, and capable machines could emerge within five, then the margin for a late start is narrow.
2. What did the IOSCO report find?
The report's central finding is that the financial industry's preparation for quantum threats is limited, even though the necessary upgrades could take years to complete. Most of the institutions IOSCO surveyed remain in the earliest phases of the work: locating the systems that would be vulnerable, training staff, or drafting plans for an eventual migration. Few said they were testing or deploying quantum-resistant protections.
That distribution matters because of the order in which the work has to happen. An institution cannot replace cryptography it has not located, and encryption is embedded in far more than a single application. It sits inside payment connections, customer databases, trading links and the software delivered by outside vendors. Building an inventory is the first step, and the survey indicates that for most firms it is also the current one.
IOSCO applies the same reasoning to banks, payment networks and crypto alike. Upgrading the protections in each could take years, so the institutions that postpone the start are the ones most likely to be exposed if capable machines arrive at the earlier end of expert expectations.
The report does not claim that a breakthrough has occurred. It states plainly that no quantum computer can currently break common encryption. Its argument rests on preparation time rather than on any single technical milestone, which is why the survey of what firms are actually doing carries as much weight in the document as the estimate of when the threat could materialise.
3. 'Quantum-procrastination' and the cost of waiting
Regulators have now given the industry's hesitation a label. IOSCO's report describes 'quantum-procrastination', a pattern in which firms recognise the threat yet hold off on acting until rules become clearer or the technology matures further.
The reasoning behind the delay is easy to follow. A firm that moves early may spend on tools that are later superseded, or commit to an approach that differs from what supervisors eventually expect. From inside a single institution, waiting can resemble prudence.
IOSCO's point is that this calculation leaves out the length of the project. When a migration is measured in years, a decision to wait for certainty uses up the time the migration itself requires. A firm that begins only once the technology is mature and the rules are settled would be starting a multi-year programme at the moment the protection is needed.
There is also an imbalance between the two possible mistakes. If capable quantum computers take longer than five years to emerge, an institution that moved early has upgraded ahead of need. If they arrive within that window and a firm has only completed its planning documents, the protections around its transactions and customer records would already be obsolete.
4. UK regulators publish joint guidance on the same day
Britain's financial authorities delivered a parallel message on Thursday. The Bank of England, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) issued joint guidance urging firms to identify vulnerable systems, plan how those systems will be replaced and assess how ready their suppliers are.
Like IOSCO, the UK regulators said that no quantum computer capable of breaking current protections is known to exist. They warned, however, that delay could expose customer data and transactions once such machines do arrive.
The reference to suppliers widens the task. Financial firms depend heavily on technology bought from third parties, so an institution's own readiness is only part of the picture. A bank that has upgraded its internal systems can still be exposed through a vendor that has not, and the guidance asks firms to examine that dependency directly.
Taken together, the three steps in the UK guidance form a sequence: find what is vulnerable, decide how to replace it, and confirm that outside providers are doing the same. IOSCO's survey suggests that the bulk of the industry is still working through the first of these.
5. How does quantum computing threaten Bitcoin and other blockchains?
Quantum computers could eventually break the protections on financial transactions by solving mathematical problems that today's machines cannot. For blockchains, the specific danger is that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could derive a private key from a public key that has been exposed, allowing an attacker to steal the funds that key controls.
Bitcoin, Ethereum (ETH) and other networks use digital signatures to establish who owns coins and to authorise their movement. A private key produces the signature, and the matching public key lets everyone else verify it. The security of the arrangement rests on the assumption that the private key cannot be calculated from the public one. With conventional computers, that assumption holds. The IOSCO report considers what happens if it stops holding.
Banks and crypto networks rely on the same family of protections for transactions, customer data and access to funds. What differs is how a failure would play out. A bank controls its own ledger and can reissue credentials through its own systems. On a public blockchain, whoever presents a valid signature is treated as the owner of the coins, and there is no central operator positioned to step in.
This is why the theft scenario features so prominently in the discussion of blockchains. The signature is not one layer of security among several. It is the mechanism that defines ownership, so a machine able to forge it would be able to spend other people's coins.
6. Older wallets remain the hardest problem
Upgrading a blockchain does not automatically protect every coin recorded on it. Even after a network adopts quantum-resistant security, coins held in older wallets would stay at risk if their owners are gone or are unable to move them to protected addresses.
This follows from how such an upgrade takes effect. New protections cover coins that are moved under the new rules, and moving them requires action by whoever holds the keys. Coins whose owners never act would remain secured by the older scheme, however thoroughly the rest of the network has migrated.
Bitcoin developers are divided over what to do about those coins. Jameson Lopp has proposed freezing coins whose owners fail to move them, which would keep a quantum-equipped attacker from seizing them. Opponents argue that no one should be able to block a holder from spending.
The dispute shows that the quantum transition is not purely an engineering matter for decentralised networks. A bank's management can order a migration and set a schedule. A blockchain has to reach agreement among the people who build and run it, and in this case the disagreement concerns property rights as much as cryptography.
7. Bigger signatures and slower networks
Stronger protection carries a performance cost. IOSCO cites research indicating that quantum-resistant signatures can be 35 to 40 times larger than the ones major blockchains use at present, and the report says the transition could make transactions both slower and more expensive.
Size matters because every transaction carries a signature and the space available on a blockchain is limited. When each signature takes up many times more room, fewer transactions fit into the same space. Users competing for that reduced capacity generally face higher fees, and the network as a whole processes less.
The report points to a concrete example involving Solana (SOL). In an experiment on a Solana test network reported in April, replacing the existing signatures with new ones cut throughput, the number of transactions processed per second, by 90%.
A test network is not a production system, and one experiment does not determine how a finished upgrade would perform. It does indicate the scale of the trade-off developers have to manage. A network whose appeal rests on processing large numbers of transactions quickly would surrender most of that speed if the test result carried over unchanged.
8. What comes next for firms and networks
For regulated institutions, the next steps are the ones the UK guidance sets out: identify vulnerable systems, plan their replacement and check suppliers' readiness. IOSCO's survey found that few firms have moved beyond those preliminaries into testing or deploying quantum-resistant protections, which is the stage where the multi-year effort it describes actually begins.
For blockchains, the open items are different. Networks moving to quantum-resistant signatures have to deal with the larger data sizes and the loss of speed that IOSCO describes, and they have to decide how to treat coins that are never migrated. That last question remains contested among Bitcoin developers, with the proposal to freeze unmoved coins set against the view that spending rights should not be restricted.
The five-year horizon cited by IOSCO is an expert estimate of when capable machines could emerge, not a forecast that they will. The report's message is that the estimate is near enough, and the required overhaul long enough, that the time available for orderly preparation is running down while much of the industry is still drawing up plans.
