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1. A Formal Review for a Post-Quantum Candidate
Blockstream Research Director Jonas Nick and Blockstream researcher Mikhail Kudinov, working with collaborators, published a security analysis of SHRINCS on Thursday, November 19, 2026. The hash-based scheme has become a frontrunner in the quantum computing Bitcoin debate, producing signatures of 548 to 5,777 bytes, compared with 64 bytes for the Taproot Schnorr signatures used on Bitcoin (BTC) today.
The analysis arrives alongside a draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal, the document format developers use to describe and debate potential changes to the network. Kudinov, who specializes in post-quantum cryptography at Blockstream, has been discussing that draft publicly and has asked for scrutiny from as wide a group as possible. "We need all the possible feedback—engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers," he said, adding that there is a great deal to check, test and criticize, or to praise where the work holds up.
Nothing about Bitcoin changes as a result of the publication itself. A security analysis is a step in a long review process in which other specialists try to find weaknesses in a design before anyone considers deploying it. What the release does is move SHRINCS from an idea under discussion to a concrete proposal with a written specification and a formal argument for why it should be considered safe.
The stakes of that review are high because signatures are the mechanism that ties coins to their owners. A flaw in a signature scheme is not a performance problem that can be tuned later; it can translate directly into lost funds. That is the reason the authors are seeking criticism from several disciplines at once, covering the mathematics, the protocol rules that would govern the scheme on the network, and the engineering required to implement it in real software.
2. What Is SHRINCS?
SHRINCS is a hash-based digital signature scheme proposed as a way for Bitcoin users to authorize transactions even if quantum computers become powerful enough to defeat the cryptography the network relies on now. Its security rests on SHA-256, the hash function Bitcoin already depends on throughout its design, including in mining.
That choice is deliberate. Many post-quantum signature designs rely on newer mathematical problems that have had far less time under attack from researchers. By building on a primitive that has been examined for decades and is already central to Bitcoin, the authors are taking a conservative route intended to keep the number of new trust assumptions as small as possible. If SHA-256 were to fail, Bitcoin would face severe problems regardless of which signature scheme it used, so anchoring signatures to the same function adds little additional exposure.
The scheme does not offer a single way of signing. It gives each user two spending paths: a small, efficient option described as stateful, and a larger, more expensive option described as stateless. The interplay between those two paths is where most of the practical questions about the proposal arise.
3. Why Quantum Computing Puts Bitcoin Signatures in Question
Every Bitcoin transaction carries a digital signature proving that the person spending the coins controls the corresponding private key. The network currently accepts two kinds: ECDSA, in use since Bitcoin's launch, and Schnorr signatures, introduced with the Taproot upgrade. Both depend on elliptic-curve mathematics, and a sufficiently capable quantum computer is widely expected to be able to solve the underlying problem and derive private keys from public ones.
Hash functions are regarded as considerably more resilient against that class of machine, which is why signature schemes built purely from hashes have become a focus of post-quantum research. The appeal for Bitcoin is that such a scheme could replace the vulnerable component, the signature, without asking users to trust unfamiliar cryptographic assumptions. The cost, as the SHRINCS figures show, is paid in size and in operational complexity.
Preparing early matters because changes to Bitcoin are slow by design. A new signature type has to be specified, reviewed, implemented in node software, supported by wallets and finally adopted by the people who hold coins, and each of those stages can take a long time. A proposal that is still gathering feedback today is being developed with that long lead time in mind, so that a vetted option exists well before it is urgently needed rather than being assembled under pressure.
4. Two Spending Paths, Two Risk Profiles
Compactness is the selling point of the stateful path. Signatures produced this way are small enough to preserve much of Bitcoin's present transaction-processing efficiency, which makes them the natural default for everyday use. The trade-off is a strict rule: each stateful key can safely sign only once.
The danger comes from breaking that rule by accident. If a one-time state is reused, an attacker could forge a valid signature for the affected address and take the funds held there. Responsibility for avoiding this falls on software, because wallet developers have to keep careful track of the state of every key so that the same one is never used twice.
This is a different kind of obligation from the one wallets carry now. With today's signatures, a key can sign any number of transactions without weakening itself, so software mainly has to keep the private key secret. A stateful scheme adds a second duty: remembering, reliably and permanently, what has already been signed. A wallet that loses or misreads that record is no longer merely inconvenienced; it becomes a potential route to theft, which is why the proposal treats bookkeeping as a security-critical function rather than a housekeeping detail.
The stateless path removes that burden. It needs no record of what has been signed before, so it carries fewer implementation-side security risks. In exchange, the signatures are larger and more costly to place on the blockchain. SHRINCS therefore asks the ecosystem to weigh two different kinds of risk against each other: the possibility of a catastrophic software or user mistake on one side, and heavier demands on scarce block space on the other.
5. How Wallets Are Expected to Prevent Catastrophic Mistakes
Nick has been explicit that the stateful design is only acceptable if ordinary users cannot get it wrong. Speaking with Isabel Foxen Duke, head of MARA Foundation, he said: "It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens." He added that "wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly."
In practice, that means the safeguard has to be automatic rather than a matter of user discipline. For SHRINCS to work safely, both its specification and the wallets that implement it must switch to the stateless path on their own whenever there is a chance that a state counter has been compromised. A wallet that cannot be certain which one-time states have already been consumed should not gamble on the compact option; it should fall back to the larger signature that carries no such hazard.
The stateless path thus serves two roles. It is a standalone choice for anyone who wants it, and it is the safety net that makes the efficient path tolerable. The quality of that fallback logic, and how reliably wallet software enforces it, is likely to be one of the most closely examined parts of the proposal.
6. How Big Are SHRINCS Signatures?
SHRINCS signatures are far larger than anything Bitcoin uses today: stateful signatures range from 548 to 4,619 bytes, and stateless signatures are 5,777 bytes. For comparison, current ECDSA signatures are typically 71 bytes and Taproot Schnorr signatures are 64 bytes. Even the smallest stateful signature is more than eight times the size of a Schnorr signature, and a stateless one is roughly 90 times as large.
Size matters because block space is limited. Larger signatures mean fewer transactions fit into each block, and users compete for that space by paying fees. Some people may decide to use stateless signatures simply out of caution, avoiding the state-tracking risk altogether. Nick has warned that if that behavior became widespread, it could bloat the blockchain and push fees higher across the network.
He was candid about how uncertain the economics are. "We don't know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures," Nick said. With fewer transactions per block, fewer people would be able to use Bitcoin directly, an outcome he said "changes the value proposition of Bitcoin."
Work to shrink the numbers is continuing. Nick noted that AI-based research has been speeding up optimizations of both the stateful and the stateless path, though the figures above describe the proposal as it currently stands.
7. What Comes Next for the Proposal
Refinement of the specification is ongoing. The SHRINCS working group includes researchers supported by nonprofit organizations such as Brink and OpenSats, both of which fund open-source Bitcoin development, and the group is still adjusting the design. Blockstream's researchers have stressed that getting the cryptography right is only half the challenge; the other half is ensuring that the software people actually use handles the scheme correctly.
Whether the Bitcoin ecosystem accepts the trade-offs SHRINCS presents will depend on the feedback stakeholders provide over the coming months. Nick and Kudinov have asked for review of both documents: the draft proposal and the security analysis that accompanies it. Engineers, cryptographers and protocol developers are all being invited to probe the work.
No schedule for a decision has been set out. For now, the questions on the table are the ones the authors themselves have raised: whether wallets can make misuse of the stateful path truly impossible, how much of the network's capacity very large signatures would consume, and what the resulting fee market would mean for who can afford to transact on Bitcoin.
