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Bitcoin Bots Grabbed Deliberately Exposed Coins Within Seconds, and a Nonce Reuse Scan Recovered 3,620 Private Keys

University of Liège researchers baited bots with weakened Bitcoin addresses and saw them claimed within seconds, then recovered 3,620 private keys exposed by repeated signing nonces across six blockchains.

Written By :MINRK
Bitcoin Bots Grabbed Deliberately Exposed Coins Within Seconds, and a Nonce Reuse Scan Recovered 3,620 Private Keys

Photo by Pankaj Patel on Unsplash

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1. Bait wallets drained in seconds

Two computer scientists at the University of Liège in Belgium, Vincent Jacquot and Benoît Donnet, showed this week that automated bots exploit a nonce reuse attack on Bitcoin almost instantly: deliberately weakened test addresses holding about $3 to $5 each were targeted within a second or a few seconds, and a separate scan recovered 3,620 private keys across six blockchains.

The experiment was small in dollar terms but pointed in its conclusion. Funds that become claimable because of a known signing mistake do not sit quietly waiting for a lucky passer-by. Software is already watching for exactly that mistake, and it competes with other software to collect the money first.

Jacquot said that at least two rival transactions tried to grab the coins from a single Bitcoin trap while they were still waiting for confirmation. In other words, more than one operator had spotted the opening and raced to exploit it before a block was mined.

2. What is nonce reuse?

Nonce reuse is a signing error in which the same one-time random number is used to sign two different transactions with the same private key, and it allows anyone who sees both signatures to calculate that key. Once the key is known, whoever computes it first can move every coin it controls.

Bitcoin, Ethereum and many other networks rely on the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, or ECDSA, to prove that the owner of an address approved a transaction. Each signature blends the owner's private key with a freshly generated random value, the nonce. The scheme is safe only if that value is unpredictable and never repeated.

When a nonce appears twice under one key, the two signatures form a pair of equations with a single unknown. Solving them is a matter of ordinary algebra rather than heavy computation, which is why the flaw can be exploited by automated scripts in a fraction of a second.

A helpful comparison is a one-time security code issued by a bank. If the same code were used to authorize two different payments, an observer holding both records could work backward to the secret that generated it. The cryptography behind Bitcoin behaves in a similar way: the safety of the private key depends entirely on each nonce being used once.

The weakness is not new. It has been understood by cryptographers for years, and it has surfaced repeatedly whenever wallet software generates poor randomness. What the Liège work adds is evidence of how quickly the opening is exploited once it appears on a public network.

3. Why the mempool makes the attack so fast

Openness is the feature that turns a signing slip into a race. Bitcoin is permissionless, and every pending transaction is broadcast to the mempool, the waiting area where transactions sit before miners add them to a block. Anyone running a node can read that queue in real time.

That visibility means attackers do not need to pick victims or break into devices. A bot can simply monitor the flow of transactions around the clock, compare signatures as they arrive and act the moment two of them share a nonce under the same key. The researchers describe this as waiting for predictable errors rather than hunting for specific targets.

Because several operators appear to run the same kind of monitoring, the contest is decided by speed. The competing transactions Jacquot observed in the mempool reflect that dynamic: whoever gets a valid claim confirmed first keeps the coins, and everyone else gets nothing.

4. How one trap was emptied, step by step

A single trap shows the sequence in detail. The researchers sent 7,200 satoshis, worth a few dollars, from one wallet to each of six freshly created addresses.

About an hour later, two of those addresses sent payments to each other that were signed with the same nonce. On its own, that revealed nothing, because the two transactions were signed by two different private keys. A repeated nonce is only dangerous when it appears twice under the same key.

The decisive step came when one address in that pair signed a third payment that again used the same nonce. At that point a single key had used the value twice, and anyone who ran the calculation could recover it.

Someone did. The next transaction to leave the bait address sent its remaining 5,200 satoshis to an outsider. It carried a valid signature made with the bait's own private key, which means the attacker had derived that key, and it was confirmed nine minutes later. The 4,700 satoshis that landed in the thief's address have stayed there ever since.

The damage did not end with one address. Because the shared nonce linked the two keys, the partner address in the original pair was exposed as well. It was not drained right away, but its funds were eventually swept too.

5. A wider scan recovered 3,620 private keys

After confirming that bots were active, Jacquot and Donnet, who work at the university's Montefiore Institute, turned to the historical record. They examined every ECDSA signature on six blockchains, from the launch of each network through June 30, 2024, looking for repeated nonces.

The search produced 3,620 recoverable private keys. Bitcoin (BTC) accounted for the overwhelming majority at 3,278. Dogecoin (DOGE) followed with 195 and Ethereum (ETH) with 119, while Litecoin (LTC) contributed 9, Bitcoin Cash (BCH) 6 and Dash (DASH) a single key.

Fifteen of those keys emerged only when the researchers analyzed all six chains together. That pattern points to faulty wallet software that reused nonces across different networks, so a signature on one chain combined with a signature on another to expose the key. At their peak, the addresses tied to those fifteen keys held just under $2,100.

The cross-chain finding matters because it shows that the risk is not confined to a single blockchain. Users who manage several assets with the same key material can be exposed by a mistake that only becomes visible when activity on separate networks is compared.

6. How much money was exposed?

The researchers estimate that roughly €101 million, or about $106 million, sat in addresses that could have been drained at some point. Jacquot said the figure was calculated by taking each vulnerable address at its highest balance and valuing it at prices from November 25, 2024.

That number is an upper bound rather than a tally of theft. It assumes an attacker reached every address at the moment it was richest and that no victim deposited more money after the key became recoverable. The study did not determine how much was actually lost.

Most of the exposure dates to Bitcoin's early years. The pool of vulnerable funds topped $1 million nine separate times, mostly between 2014 and early 2016, and reached a high of about $26 million in December 2014. Later spikes came in 2022, at about $12 million, and in 2023, at roughly $1 million, largely on Ethereum.

The concentration in the early period fits the history of the ecosystem. Wallet software was less mature, tooling for generating secure randomness was less standardized, and fewer developers had experience with the pitfalls of ECDSA. The later Ethereum spikes show that the problem has not disappeared as the industry has grown.

7. Signs of attacks going back to 2015

Withdrawals that look suspicious stretch back years. The earliest flagged activity on Bitcoin dates to the fourth quarter of 2015, suggesting that some operators were already exploiting repeated nonces in that period.

One Ethereum case illustrates the speed involved. In November 2022, a deposit of 6 ETH and then a deposit of 350 ETH arrived at a single exposed address, and another address claimed the funds 12 seconds later.

Jacquot cautioned that the paper does not separate genuine attacks from ordinary withdrawals made by the rightful owners. A quick transfer out of an exposed address could be a theft, but it could also be the owner moving funds, so the historical data shows opportunity and suspicious timing rather than proof of crime in every instance.

The researchers also concluded that attackers appear to be selective. Based on their observations, they suggest that Dogecoin, Dash and Litecoin are probably not under active scrutiny, in contrast to Bitcoin and Ethereum, where the bait was claimed quickly.

8. Remaining exposure and the Coldcard precedent

Some vulnerable money is still out there. Most of the funds that remain exposed sit at one Bitcoin address that uses an uncommon format. The paper does not identify the address or disclose its current balance, an omission that avoids handing a target to the same bots the study documented.

The research arrives a few months after another reminder that weak randomness is costly. In July, a flaw in the way Coldcard hardware wallets generated keys allowed attackers to drain 594 BTC in a sweep that took 25 minutes. The mechanism was different, but the lesson is the same: when the numbers that protect a private key are not truly random, the funds behind it can disappear quickly.

Both cases show that security failures in self-custody are often not dramatic break-ins. They are quiet implementation errors in software that most users never inspect and could not evaluate even if they tried.

9. Who should fix the problem?

The researchers argue that ordinary users cannot be expected to avoid these mistakes on their own. Most people who hold Bitcoin do not choose how their wallet generates nonces, and many would have no way of knowing that a signing routine was flawed until their funds were gone.

Instead, Jacquot and Donnet call on developers, wallet providers and exchanges to build safeguards so that common errors cannot be exploited the instant they occur. That responsibility falls on the teams that write and maintain signing software, since they control the code where nonces are produced.

Well-established techniques already exist for this purpose. Many modern libraries derive the nonce deterministically from the private key and the message being signed, so that the same value cannot be reused for different transactions. The Liège findings suggest that wherever such protections are missing or poorly implemented, the window between a mistake and a theft can be measured in seconds.

For holders, the practical takeaway is that the quality of wallet software matters as much as the secrecy of a seed phrase. A private key that has never been shared with anyone can still be exposed by the way it is used, and on a public network the bots watching for that slip are already in place.

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