Regulation•

Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu and BYD Seek US Licenses for Advanced Chips as Washington Extends Controls to Offshore Data Centers

The US Commerce Department has received license applications for advanced American chips from Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu and BYD, days after a November 16 rule tightened controls on offshore data centers.

Written By :MINRK
Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu and BYD Seek US Licenses for Advanced Chips as Washington Extends Controls to Offshore Data Centers

Photo by Brecht Corbeel on Unsplash

1. Four Chinese giants test US AI chip export controls

The US Commerce Department has received applications for advanced American semiconductors from four of China's largest companies: Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu and BYD. The requests come as AI chip export controls tighten further, with the department's Bureau of Industry and Security issuing an interim final rule on November 16, 2026, that extends licensing requirements to five more countries and to data centers serving Chinese firms.

Together the two developments show the shape of current American policy on high-end computing hardware. Washington has not shut the door on sales to China, but every request passes through a licensing office that weighs how much processing power can safely be sold to a strategic competitor. At the same time, the government is moving to block the indirect routes by which that power has been reaching Chinese companies.

The applicants span much of China's technology economy. Alibaba and Tencent run the country's biggest cloud and internet platforms, Baidu is a leading developer of search and artificial intelligence services, and BYD is among the world's largest makers of electric vehicles. All four depend on high-performance processors to train and run AI systems, and the most capable of those processors are designed by American companies.

The stakes are measured in computing capacity. Training a modern AI model requires thousands of specialized processors working in parallel, and the pace at which a company can develop new systems depends heavily on how many of those processors it can obtain. A licensing decision in Washington therefore feeds directly into the product plans of companies on the other side of the Pacific.

2. Who decides whether the chips can be sold?

The decision rests with the Bureau of Industry and Security, or BIS, the arm of the Commerce Department that issues export licenses for sensitive technology. Any American company that wants to ship controlled chips to a Chinese buyer needs the bureau's approval first.

BIS administers the rules that determine which goods can leave the United States, to whom and under what conditions. In the case of advanced semiconductors, its reviews turn on the performance of the chip, the identity of the end user and the risk that the hardware could be put to military use or passed on to a party barred from receiving it.

Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu and BYD are the companies most directly affected by the current round of reviews. The scrutiny they face is part of a tighter export control regime that has taken shape during 2026, one that treats each sale as a case to be examined rather than applying a single blanket answer.

3. Approvals come with caps, monitoring and a 25% tariff

An application to BIS is not automatically refused. The bureau has already cleared a limited group of Chinese entities to buy Nvidia's H200 graphics processing units, a class of chip used to train and operate AI models, in restricted quantities.

Those approvals carry conditions. Each approved buyer may purchase up to 75,000 chips, a ceiling that limits how much computing capacity any single company can assemble through the licensed channel. End-use monitoring is mandatory, which means the use of the hardware is tracked after delivery rather than being left to the buyer's assurances.

Resale to sanctioned entities is prohibited. A chip sold lawfully to an approved firm cannot be passed along to a company on a US blacklist, a restriction intended to stop licensed buyers from acting as a conduit for those who could not obtain a license themselves.

There is also a financial cost. The United States imposes a 25% tariff on certain advanced chip shipments that are routed through the country on their way to Chinese firms. For buyers, that charge comes on top of the price of hardware that is already among the most expensive in the technology industry.

The process has not been quick. Earlier approvals were held up by compliance hurdles and enforcement scrutiny, a record that suggests the four new applicants should expect a slow path through the system rather than a prompt answer.

4. The offshore data center route narrows

Direct sales are only one way Chinese companies have obtained access to advanced processors. Another has been to use data centers located outside China, where the chips are installed abroad and the computing power is delivered remotely. In that arrangement the hardware never enters China, but the benefit of it does.

Remote access has been difficult for export rules to capture because those rules were built around the movement of physical goods. A shipment of chips to a facility in a third country is, on paper, a sale to that country. Who ultimately uses the processing power once the machines are switched on is a separate question, and it is that question the new measure addresses.

The interim final rule that BIS issued on November 16, 2026, is aimed at that workaround. It takes effect on publication in the Federal Register, which was scheduled for November 19.

Under the rule, export licenses are required for advanced AI chips bound for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil. The measure also reaches beyond those five countries: it covers any data center, anywhere in the world, that supplies substantial computing power to companies based in China or in other restricted nations.

The rule gives 'substantial' a specific meaning. The threshold is more than 12 million in aggregate total processing performance, a measure the US government uses to express the combined computing capability of a set of chips. A facility below that line is outside the data center provision; one above it needs a license if it serves covered companies.

Existing arrangements are not cut off overnight. Affected companies have 90 days to secure licenses. The stated aim of the rule is to close the loopholes that have allowed Chinese firms to reach advanced chips through data centers overseas.

5. A policy of the qualified yes

American controls on semiconductor exports grew out of national security concerns about technological competition with China. The worry in Washington is that the same processors that power commercial AI services can also support military and intelligence applications, and that selling them freely would erode an American advantage.

Over time the controls have tightened rather than loosened. Successive rounds of rules have lowered the performance levels at which a chip becomes restricted, widened the list of countries and companies covered and added conditions to the sales that are still allowed.

The H200 approvals mark a significant adjustment within that framework. They reflect an effort to balance security concerns against the commercial interests of American chipmakers, for whom China has been a very large market. A flat ban protects one interest at the expense of the other; a conditional license attempts to serve both.

The result is a system in which sales are permitted but only under heavy supervision. Quantity caps limit the scale of any buyer's purchases, monitoring follows the chips after delivery and tariffs raise the price. The answer to a Chinese applicant can be yes, but it is a yes with terms attached.

That approach places a heavy burden on enforcement. A cap or a resale ban is only as effective as the government's ability to verify that it is being observed, which is why the conditions attached to the H200 approvals lean so heavily on monitoring, and why the new data center rule focuses on who receives the computing power rather than only on where the chips are shipped.

6. What it means for the applicants, Nvidia and data center operators

For Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu and BYD, the practical issues are cost and timing. Tariffs and compliance requirements could raise operating expenses, and a lengthy review could delay the rollout of products that depend on the hardware.

Winning a license would not end the matter. A licensee still faces the quantity cap, continuing monitoring and ongoing attention from trade regulators. The approval is the start of a supervised relationship rather than a one-time clearance.

The data center rule adds a second source of pressure. Companies that have relied on facilities in Southeast Asia to get around limits at home now have 90 days to obtain a license or find another arrangement.

A firm in that position has a limited set of choices. It can seek a license for the arrangement, reduce its use of the facility until it falls under the processing threshold, or look for capacity that is not covered by the rule. Each option carries its own cost, and none can be completed without attention to the deadline.

For Nvidia, approved H200 sales reopen access to Chinese customers. How far that access extends is limited by the same conditions that bind the buyers: the caps, the 25% tariff and the monitoring requirements together constrain the volume of business the licensed channel can carry.

Operators of data centers in the five named countries have work to do as well. Each must determine whether its facilities cross the processing threshold and, if it serves clients from China or other restricted countries, apply for a license accordingly.

7. What happens next

Two things will show how the policy works in practice. The first is how BIS handles the four applications now before it. Given the delays that affected earlier approvals, the speed of the decisions may say as much about the direction of US policy as the decisions themselves.

The second is the 90-day compliance window created by the data center rule. The number of operators that obtain licenses, compared with the number that restructure their customer base instead, will indicate whether the offshore route has actually been closed or has simply moved somewhere else.

Both tests bear on the same underlying question, which is whether a system of conditional approvals can satisfy the security concerns that produced the controls while still allowing American chipmakers to sell into China. The applications from Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu and BYD, and the response of data center operators in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil, will supply the first evidence.

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